Abstract. RFID technology is a ubiquitous technology, and seems destined to become more a more ubiquitous. Traditional cryptographic primitives are not supported on low-cost RFID tags since, at most, 4K gates can be devoted to security-related tasks. Despite this, there are a vast number of proposals based on the use of classical hash functions, an assumption that is not realistic (at least at the present time). Furthermore, none of the published authentication protocols are resistant to active attacks. We try to address these two issues in this work by designing a new authentication protocol, secure against passive and active attacks, inspired by Shieh et al.'s protocol for smart-cards, but adapted to RFID systems. The original Shieh et al.'s scheme is considered one of the most secure an efficient protocols in the smart-card field. Because in this protocol tags should support a hash-function on-board, a new lightweight hash function, named Tav-128, is also proposed. A preliminary security analysis is shown, as well as a study on its hardware complexity, which concludes that its implementation is possible with around 2.6K gates.
Introduction
One of the main problems that ubiquitous computing has to solve before its wide development is privacy [1] . In the RFID context, products labeled with insecure tags reveal sensitive information when queried by readers. Additionally, tags usually answer different queries with the same identifier. These predictable tag responses allow a third party to establish an association between tags and their owners. In addition to the previous threats, there are some other aspects that must be considered: eavesdropping, counterfeiting, physical attacks, active attacks, etc. To depth in all these matters we recommend the reading of [2, 3, 4] where surveys of the most important advances in RFID technology are presented.
Low-cost RFID tags are very computationally limited devices due to its severe price restriction (.05 -0.1 ¤). Tags can only store hundreds of bits, and have 250-4K gates to implement security functions [5] . Even under these conditions, most of the proposed solutions in the literature are based on hash functions or R i = h(ID i ⊕ x) ⊕ P W i and issues U i a smart-card containing R i and h(), where h() is a one-way hash-function, x is the secret key maintained by the server, and the symbol "⊕" denotes the exclusive-or operation. Fig. 1 is an illustration of messages transmitted during the login and key agreement phase in Shieh's scheme. When user U i wants to login to the server, he first inserts his smart-card into a card reader then inputs his identity ID i and password P W i . Next, the smart-card performs the followings steps:
Login and Key Agreement Phase
1. Compute a i = R i ⊕ P W i . 2. Acquire current time stamp T u , store T u until the end of the session, and compute M AC u = h(T u ||a i ). 3. Send message (ID i , T u , M AC u ) to the server. After receiving message (ID i , T u , M AC u ) from U i , the server performs the following steps to assure the integrity of the message, answer to U i , and challenge U i to avoid replay attacks:
1. Check the freshness of T u . If T u has already appeared in a current execution session of user U i , reject U i 's login request and stop the session. Otherwise T u is fresh. 
Compute a
On receiving the message (T u , T s , MAC s ) from the server, the smart-card performs the following steps to authenticate the server, achieves a session key agreement, and answers to the server.
1. Check if the received T u is equal to the stored T u to assure the freshness of the received message. If is not, report login failure to the user and stop the session. 
Our Scheme
In this section, a new protocol adapted to RFID systems and resistant to passive and active attacks (inspired in Shieh et al.'s protocol) is proposed. First, we will mention some peculiarities of RFID systems which should be considered in the new design. These will force changes in the protocol, which will be presented next. In Shieh et al.'s protocol, when the user wants to login in the server "he first inserts the card into a card-reader...". In a RFID system, tags (T ) will be equivalent to smart-cards and readers to card-readers, respectively. Note RFID readers (R) are assumed to be connected to back-end databases (B) over a secure channel. Additionally, both devices have "non-limited" computing and storing capabilities. In the following, when we refer to a RFID reader an entity composed by a reader and a back-end database is considered.
However, there are significant differences between smart-card and RFID systems. RFID technology operates through the radio channel, so communication could be eavesdropped. Another particularity is the asymmetry of the communication channel, which allows monitorization of the forward channel (readerto-tag) from a much longer distance than the backward channel (tag-to-reader). Smart-cards are usually tamper resistant devices, which is not the case of RFID tags. Furthermore, when then smart-card is inserted in the reader an user intervention is necessary, entering his identity and password. In RFID technology, however, interactions between tags and readers are automatic.
Taking into account all these considerations, Shieh et al's scheme has been adapted. Our proposed scheme consists on two phases: the registration phase, and the mutual authentication and index-pseudonym update phase. The following symbols have been used:
xi: secret key maintained by the reader Nz: random number generated by z h(): secure one-way hash function ⊕: exclusive-or operation ||: string concatenation operation 
Registration Phase
The user or holder of the tag submits his static identifier ID i 1 and a freely chosen password P W i to the reader over a secure channel for registration. If the request is accepted, the reader generates a random index-pseudonym IDS
1 The tag will replace its identifier ID i by IDS are initially set to IDS 0 i . The password P W i will be used by the holder of the tag (over a secure channel) to temporarily deactivate the tag. In this case, a i will be replaced by
Mutual Authentication and Index-Pseudonym Update
The messages interchanged in our scheme are shown in Fig. 2 . First, the reader usually applies a probabilistic (ie. Aloha-based algorithm) or determinist (ie. Binary tree-walking protocol) collision avoidance protocol to singulate a tag out of many [9] . Upon singulation condition, the reader will send a "hello" message to the tag. To start the mutual authentication, the tag accomplishes the following steps:
1. Generate a random number N Ti 2 , and store N Ti temporarily until the end of the session.
1 A 64-bit length identifier is compatible with all the encoding schemes (SGTIN, SSCC, GLN, etc) defined by EPCGlobal [14] . Due to this reason, we assume that tag static identifier (IDi), and index-pseudonyms (IDS n i ) are 64-bit length. Additionally, the secret key xi is xored with IDi to compute ai, so xi length is also set to 64-bits. 2 Tags conforming with EPC Class-1 Gen-2 specification support a 16-bit PRNG [15] .
We suggest that 32-bit PRNGs should be supported on low-cost RFID tags, as mentioned in [16, 17] . So, 32-bit length could be an adequate value to NT i and NR.
Compute h(N
to the reader and wait for response.
Once the previous message is received, its integrity is checked and the reader answer includes a challenge to avoid replay attacks:
1. Check the newness of N Ti . If N Ti has already come out in a current mutual authentication, the protocol is stopped in this point. Otherwise N Ti is fresh.
) and p = h(N Ti ||IDS old i ) and check wether any of the two values is equal to the received h(N Ti ||IDS n i ). The above procedure is repeated for each entry (row) in the database until a match is found. If not found, the protocol is stopped at this point.
Compute a
i = h(ID i ⊕ x i ), M AC Ti = h(N Ti ||a i ),
and check if it is equal to
M AC Ti . If not, the protocol is stopped and a check over tag deactivation is taken by computing
and verifying if it is equal to M AC Ti . A match will imply that the tag has been deactivated temporally by its holder. 4. Acquire a fresh random number N R .
2 For avoiding replay attacks, the pair (N Ti , N R ) is stored until the end of the session.
Compute M AC
back to the tag and wait for response.
After receiving the message (N R , M AC R ), the following steps are accomplished to authenticate the reader, achieve new material to update the indexpseudonym, and finally answer to the reader: When the message M AC Ti is received, the reader computes M AC Ti = h(N R ||(a i + 1)) and checks whether it is equal to M AC Ti . If not, the protocol is stooped. At this point, both the reader and the tag have mutually authenticated. Additionally, both possess two nonces (N Ti , N R ), which have been interchanged. Shieh et al. proposed using this fresh material to establish a session key agreement. In our case this material is employed to update the index-pseudonym. Obviously, the tag and reader have to be synchronized.
The glib solution for the synchronization problem will be to update the indexpseudonym in the tag when message 4 is sent, and this updating will be performed in the reader when checking this message. Under this scenario an attacker (active attack) could intercept message 4 avoiding the update of the indexpseudonym in the reader with the consequently losing of synchronization. A naive solution will consist on assuming that after the end of the protocol, completion messages are sent between the involved entities. However, these messages could be also intercepted. Additionally, note that tags are much more constrained devices than readers. For this reason, a new message 5 has been added to the protocol (Message Update Code -MUC), and readers will have to store the old and the new index-pseudonym to prevent the interception of this message. To complete the protocol, the following steps are performed by the reader: ) and send it to the tag, including the two nonces interchanged between reader and tag and the new indexpseudonym.
When the message M U C R is received from reader, the tag accomplishes the following steps to verify a successfully index-pseudonym update has been performed in the reader:
) and check whether M U C R is equal to M U C R . If this is the case, update the index-pseudonym.
Security Analysis
The robustness of the proposed protocol against the main important attacks is analyzed in the following.
User Privacy
Tag ID i must be kept secure to guarantee user's privacy. In order to protect it, both the tag's memory and the radio channel have been taken into account. In the registration phase, the static identifier ID i and the password P W i are submitted to the reader over a secure channel. To avoid radio access to the static identifier, ID i is replaced by the hash of ID i ⊕ x i . Note, x i is a secret key only known by the reader. Additionally, and similarly to what happens in e-passports, we recommended the ID i to be printed as a machine-readable code as illustrated in Fig. 2 . In the radio channel, the value of IDS n i is protected by the use of a secure one-way hash function h(). In the same way, a i can not be derived from the messages authentication codes M AC Ti , M AC R and M AC Ti .
Location Privacy
The secure protection of tag information does not ensure location privacy. Constant answers would allow an attacker to identify each tag with its ).
holder. To protect the index-pseudonym, only its hash is transmitted. As the index-pseudonym is not updated until the completion of the protocol, and the protocol may be accidentally or intentionally interrupted, the hash of the IDS i concatenated with nonce N Ti is really sent. Similarly, a i is anonymized by means of the use of message authentication codes where a kind of challenge-response nonces are included. Finally, sending the message update code M U C R = h((N Ti ⊕ N R )||IDS n+1 ), the new index-pseudonym is hidden. So, in order to avoid tracking, all the information is anonymized.
Data Integrity
Based on the use of a mutual authentication approach, our protocol guarantees data integrity between tag and reader. On the other hand, tag's memory is rewritable so modifications are possible. In this memory, both a i and the index-pseudonym IDS n i are stored. If an attacker does succeed in modifying this part of the memory, the reader would not recognize the tag, having to carry out the registration phased again (see Sect. 3.1 ).
Mutual Authentication
Due to the fact that both tag and reader authenticate each other, by means of message authentication codes M AC R and M AC Ti , mutual authentication is accomplished. These message authentication codes include a i , a secret only shared between them, preventing any other to create correct M ACs, and in this way guaranteeing the legitimacy of each part. Therefore, it is infeasible for a fraudulent reader or tag to impersonate another entity.
Replay Attack
Our protocol is based on a challenge-response scheme, so replay attacks are prevented because challenges are different each time and long enough to prevent attacks based on storing them. In our scheme, any replay attack will not be able to correctly answer the challenges that form part of the protocol. In message 2, tag sends (h(N Ti ||IDS n i ), N Ti , M AC Ti ) where a nonce N Ti is included. Therefore, the reader must include N Ti in the answer message, so in message 3 the reader sends (N R , M AC R = h(N Ti ||N R ||a i )), including not only the response nonce N Ti but also a challenge nonce N R . Then, tag sends M AC Ti = h(N R ||(a i + 1)) back, including N R , to the reader. So, only legitimate parties (reader+tag) can send valid answers as challenge nonces are joined with the message authentication codes requiring the knowledge of a i .
Forgery Resistance
All the sensitive information stored in the tag (IDS n i , a i ) is never sent in clear in the communication channel. In all cases, this information is concatenated with a nonce and hashed before passed on the channel. Therefore, the simple copy of information by eavesdropping is not useful to an adversary. 7. Active Attacks (a) Man-in-the-middle attack: If an attacker tries to impersonate a legitimate reader to obtain information from a tag, perhaps to be able to impersonate it in a future. This kind of attack is not feasible because all messages include a message authentication code, which requires the knowledge of the secret a i shared only between the tag and the reader. In the previous scenario, the fraudulent reader will not be able to generate message 3, so the capture of the message 4 sent back by the tag will be a vain attempt. Moreover, in future sessions, a new challenge would be used by the reader preventing any advantage from knowing old messages. . When the reader checks its integrity, it first will try with the new index-pseudonym, and if it fails, then he will try with the old index-pseudonym. Next, the rest of the protocol will be accomplished ensuring the recovery of a synchronization loss.
Hash-Function
Traditional cryptographic primitives excess the capabilities of low-cost RFID tags. The required hardware complexity of these devices may be weighted up by its circuit area or the number of equivalent logic gates. At most, around 4K gates are assumed to be devoted to security-related task [5] . The best implementation of SHA-256 requires around 11K gates and 1120 clock cycles to performing a hash calculation on a 512-bit data block [18] . As the number of needed resources are quite higher than those of a low-cost RFID tag, it may seem natural to propose the use of another smaller hash functions. However, functions such as SHA-1 (8.1K gates, 1228 clock cycles) or MD5 (8.4K gates, 612 clock cycles) can not be fitted either in a tag [18] . Recently, some authors suggest the usage of a "universal hash function" [19] . Although this solution only needs around 1.7K gates, a deeper security analysis is needed and has not yet been accomplished. Furthermore, this function has only a 64-bit output, which does not guarantee an appropriate security level because finding collisions is a relatively easy task due to the birthday paradox (around 2 32 operations). For this reason, we propose a 128-bit hash function named Tav-128 that can be fitted in low-cost RFID tags and provides a suitable security level for most applications.
Tav-128 Security Analysis
Some of the recent cryptanalytic attacks on many of the most important hash functions [20, 21] rely in the fact that these constructions generally use a very linear (LFSR-based) expansion algorithm. In order to avoid this, we have decided to make the expansion of the Tav-128 hash function (corresponding to algorithms C and D in the code shown in the Appendix A) highly nonlinear. As, on the other hand, the resulting function should be very efficient and lightweight both from the gate count and the throughput point of view, we have found these functions by evolving compositions of extremely light operands by means of genetic programming, as described in [22] .
We have also tried to include a filter phase (corresponding to algorithms A and B in the Appendix A) in the input of the Tav-128 function, in order to avoid the attacker to have direct access to any bit of the internal state. Not having this possibility, some attacks that have been found on other cryptographic primitives in the past are precluded. So, decreasing the control the attacker has over the hash functions inputs significantly complicates his task.
An output length of 128 bits was found to be a reasonable compromise between speed and robustness to realistic attacks in the intended scenarios. Additionally, we propose the use of eight rounds in the internal loop (r2 parameter) for having and adequate security margin, though we have found that even with six rounds (which will significantly improve its performance) the overall scheme seems to be secure.
We have performed an additional security analysis of Tav-128, consisting on examining the statistical properties of its output over a very low entropy input. Specifically, 2
25 32-bit inputs have been generated by means of an incremental counter (x, x+1, x+2, etc). After randomly initializing (with values obtained from http://randomnumber.org) the internal state and the accumulated hash a0 value, we compute the output of Tav-128 for each counter value input (Tav(x), Tav(x+1), Tav(x+2), etc). The resulting hashes have been analyzed with two well-known suites of randomness tests, namely ENT [23] and DIEHARD [24] . The results are presented in Tables 1 and 2 (see Appendix A). Tav-128 also passed the very demanding -because it is oriented to cryptographic applications-NIST [25] statistical battery. We have computed 100 p-values for each test, being all the results compatible with a uniform U (0, 1). The whole report is available in http://163.117.149.137/tav/ due to the huge amount of p-values generated.
Authors acknowledge that successfully passing these statistical batteries, even over a very low-entropy input, does not prove security, but we believe that it points out the nonexistence of trivial weaknesses.
Hardware Complexity
One of the most relevant aspects considered in the design of Tav-128 was the sort of operations that can be employed. As tags are very restricted computationally, only simple operations have been used. For example, multiplication has been ruled out due to its high cost [26] . Concretely, the following operators have been finally used: right shifts, bitwise xor, and addition mod 2 32 . The necessary architecture to implement Tav-128 can be divided in two main blocks: -Memory blocks. All the used variables are stored in this part: state (128-bits), accumulated hash a0 (32-bits), internal variables h0 (32-bits) and h1 (32-bits), and the input a1 (32-bits). -Arithmetic logic Unit. In this unit the addition mod 2 32 and the bitwise xor operation are implemented. As the h0 and h1 functions consist of three or more components, an auxiliary register to store the intermediate results is necessary.
Although we have not implemented Tav-128 in hardware, an overestimation of its gate counting can be easily obtained. The function bitwise xor requires 32 logic gates as we are operating with 32-bit variables. For implementing the add with carry circuit, a parallel architecture is proposed. Six logic gates are needed for each bit added in parallel. 4 The registers will be implemented by means of flip-flops. A gate count of 8 has been chosen for implementing a flipflop as in [27] . So, 2304 logic gates are necessary to store the memory block and the auxiliary register. Additionally, around 50 extra logic gates are employed to control the internal state of the hash function. Therefore, 2578 logic gates are needed for implementing Tav-128.
Another key aspect to consider is throughput. We reckon that 1568 clock cycles are needed for executing one Tav-128 hash. Due to the fact that lowcost RFID tags imply serious powers restrictions, we assume that the clock frequency is set to 100 KHz. Under this conditions, the throughput obtained by a tag that would have on-chip Tav-128 will be around 65 hashes/sec. It is generally accepted that at least between 50-100 tags should be authenticated per second [28] . In order words, a tag may use up at the most 2000 clock cycles (@100Khz) to answer a reader. In some applications 65 hashes/sec may not be enough, so we have analyzed how to increment the speed of Tav-128. In the initial proposed scheme (see Appendix A), we have a parameter (r2), which fits the number of rounds computed in the C and D algorithms. This parameter has been initially fixed to eight rounds in order to guarantee a high avalanche effect. After accomplishing a deeper study, we have determined that r2 may be reduced to six rounds. So, the speed of the tag will be incremented in a 25% or in other words, the tag may compute around 80 hashes/sec. Note that for non-high speed demanding applications, we recommend to fix r2 to eight rounds.
Conclusions
Since 2002, there has been a great number of publications concerned with the security of RFID technology. In the majority of those proposals, the security objectives are focused on privacy, tracking, counterfeiting, etc. All this kind of attacks are passive, but active attacks can not be ruled out in many scenarios.
A new protocol not only resistant to standard passive attacks but also resistant to active attacks is proposed. Another interesting property is that tags can be temporally deactivated without data loss. Instead of beginning from scratch, we have tried to avoid past errors in the designing of our protocol. RFID technology has similarities with other technologies such as wireless, bluetooth, smart-card, etc. Indeed, we focused our attention to smart-card, which is a mature technology. Concretely, we spotlight on remote authentication protocols, which started to be developed in 1980. During years many researchers have been working in order to propose more secure and efficient schemes. Recently, Shieh et al. have proposed a new scheme that can be considered one of the most secure and efficient protocols. For this reason we decide to propose a new protocol for RFID systems inspired in Shieh et al.'s protocol.
The proposed protocol is based on the use of a secure hash function. As traditional cryptographic primitives such as SHA-256 or MD5 lie well beyond the capabilities of low-cost RFID tags, a new hash function (Tav-128) is proposed. Tav-128 can be implemented with only around 2.6K gates, and 1568 cycles (1248 if r2 parameter is set to six). Therefore, Tav-128 can be fitted in a real low-cost RFID tags. Although further security analysis of the new hash function is needed, this preliminary analysis seems to point out that it gives an adequate security level for the intending application (mutual authentication of low-cost tags). To conclude, although this hash function constitutes a great advance, as a future work we plan to design a new version where the number of processing cycles was reduced without incrementing the number of logical gates. 
